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TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS INTERESTS. (Continued.)*
V. INCOME TA xEs.
Of the petroleum producing states only Oklahoma and
Arkansas have income tax laws. The Oklahoma income tax law
is purely personal and the rates are low. The law was enacted
in 1915, amended in 1917, and again amended and re-enacted
in its present form in 1921.198 The law as originally enacted
and re-enacted in 1921 levies a tax upon every person in the
state upon the entire net income from all sources. A like tax is
levied upon the entire net income derived from all property
owned, business, trade or professions carried on in the state by
non-residents. Under the law of 1921 husband and wife having
separate incomes liable to taxation may make separate returns.
The rates in 1915 were reduced in 1917 and the rates of the
latter year were carried into the 1921 law. Under Section 7,
$3,000 is exempt from taxation. On the first $10,000 of taxable
income the rate is 712 mills; on the next $15,000 the rate is 15
mills, and on all excess 20 mills. Corporations are not subject
to the income tax; it is entirely a personal tax with liberal
exemption and at low rates.
The Arkansas income tax law was enacted in 1929,199 and in
Article II, Section 3(a), it imposes a tax upon the entire net
income, of every resident, individual, trust or estate. The rates
are progressive. The first $3,000 of taxable income is taxed at
1 per cent, the next $3,000 at 2 per cent, the next $14,000 at
4 per cent, and all in excess of $25,000 at 5 per cent. The same
Section (b) imposes a tax on every domestic corporation with
respect to carrying on or doing business equivalent to 2 per
cent of its entire net income; and every foreign corporation
doing business within the state is taxed annually equivalent to
2 per cent of a proportion of the entire net income. And under
subdivision (c) a like tax is imposed upon the entire net income
from all property owned and from every business, trade or occu-
pation carried on in the state by individuals, corporations, part-
nerships, trusts or estates, not residents of Arkansas. In section
* Continued from March issue.
'"Session Laws of Okla, 1915, Ch. 164. Ibid., 1917, House Bill No.
350. Ibid., 1921, Ch. 44.
Acts of Ark., 1929, Act. 118.
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16 exemptions are allowed of $1,500 to single persons and $2,500
to heads of families, and in addition, $400 for each dependent
under 18, or incapable of self-support.
The laws are alike with respect to the jurisdiction exercised
and are based upon erroneous principles in so far as they under-
take to tax the income of residents which is derived from
without the state. No state should tax any income except that
derived within its borders, and that should be taxed alike to resi-
dents and non-residents. No case has arisen under the Arkansas
law, but several have construed the Oklahoma law.
The constitutionality of the Oklahoma law was raised in the
Shaffer case in which the enforcement of the tax assessed was
sought to be restricted on the ground of invalidity of the statute.
The plaintiff, a non-resident, was operating several oil and gas
leases in Oklahoma. He contended that the state was without
jurisdiction to levy an income tax upon non-residents and that
the lien imposed by the law upon the entire property violated
the due process clause, both of which contentions were decided
against him. He further contended that the gross production
tax levied in lieu of all other taxes included the income tax.
As to that the court held that this tax was a substitute for the
ad valorem tax only and not for the income tax. The income
tax law was not repeated by implication by the enactment of the
gross production law and double taxation was not violative of
the 14th amendment, if it existed.200
The question has arisen whether the state had power under
the income tax law of 1915 to levy an income tax upon incomes
derived from lessee's private personal share of oil and gas pro-
duced under departmental leases upon restricted Indian lands,
and the power was upheld by the state court.20 1 But the case
was reversed by the U. S. Supreme Court which held that the
net income derived by a lessee from sales of his share of oil and
gas received under leases of restricted Indian lands, which
constituted him in effect an instrumentality used by the U. S.
in fulfilling its duties to the Indians, cannot be taxed by the
state.20 2 But the lessee of an oil and gas lease of restricted
Indian lands is not exempt from federal income tax, although the
power is withheld from the states in absence of congressional
-' Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37.State v. Gillespie, 81 Okla. 103.
"2 Gillespie v. Okla., 2571 U. S. 501; Carter v. Phillips, 88 Okla. 202.
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assent.20 3 And the Treasury Department has always collected
income taxes from leases of Indian oil lands, a practice with
which Congress never interfered. And the lessee's income from
the sale of oil and gas produced under leases from the State of
Texas is subject to federal income tax.2 ° 3*
On lands that have proved to be oil producing leases are
often made or assigned for very substantial cash considerations
in addition to the regular reserved royalties. These cash con.
siderations, denominated "bonuses," have been held subject to
the state income tax in Oklahoma. 20 4 In the Rector case it was
contended that the bonus of $300,000 was not income but was a
conversion of capital not taxable within the act, but the court
overruled the contention. In the McCauley case the bonus paid
for a lease on already producing oil property, amounting to
$130,000 was held to constitute income to the land owner and
taxable under the law of 1915. The same contention, that it
was a conversion of capital which was not taxable as income,
was made and overruled.
Section 6 of the law of 1915 provides that in computing the
net income there shall be allowed as deductions from the income
of any person "a reasonable allowance for exhaustion,
not to exceed in the case of mines, five per cent of the gross
value at the mine . . . ; Provided, that no deduction shall be
allowed for any amount paid out for new buildings, permanent
improvements, or betterments, made to increase the value of
any property or estate." In a case construing this statute with
respect to a return of net income arising under an oil lease, it
was first held that an oil and gas well is not a mine so that the
taxpayer was not limited in his deduction to five per cent of the
gross value of the production of his oil and gas wells for the
taxable year, but he was entitled to a reasonable allowance for
exhaustion which was a question of fact. That allowance he
was entitled to have ascertained under the "unit of production"
method. Under it the total amount of the recoverable oil in the
property is determined, as nearly as possible, and to each barrel
of this oil is assigned its part of the capital investment, and as
that barrel of oil is produced and sold, from the sale price
Heiner v. Colonial Trust Co., 48 S. Ct. 65.
201* Group No. 1I Ol Corp. v. Bass. 51 S. Ct. 432.
Carter v. Rector, 88 Okla. 12; Carter v. McCauley, 97 Okla. 255.
K. L. J.-
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received therefor is taken first, the expense of producing it,
and second, its proportion of the capital investment, leaving
the balance as profit. Secondly, the cost of the actual drilling,
such as labor, fuel and the like, as charged as expense, and the
cost of derricks, casing, tubing, rods and other equipment was
added to the capital account, and depreciated by taking the
total cost of equipment, less any salvage value, and distributing
this to the entire recoverable oil and each barrel of oil made to
pay its proportionate part. Third, derricks, casing and other
oil well equipment are not permanent improvements or better-
ments made to increase the value of the property, within the
proviso, but are merely temporary equipment used only for the
purpose of producing oil or gas, and may therefore, be charged
to the capital account. Fourth, under the law of 1915 the
income of the husband and wife and each child under 18 should
be added together and one joint return made and the exemption
provided for the head of the family and dependents should be
allowed. And if the wife sells property to the husband result-
ing in income, that income should be added to the income of the
husband. And income derived from departmental leases should
not be included in taxable income.20 5
We have already seen that California allows for the deple-
tion of oil and gas wells.20 6 California has adopted the
provision of the federal revenue act of 1926 governing depletion.
Depletion has been defined as "the return of capital invested
in natural resources; through the gradual exhaustion of the
quantity or units in the ground." The Treasury Department
defines it thus: "Depletion is the loss sustained through the
progressive removal of natural resources, as of mineral
deposits."120 7 The Revenue Act of 1926, See. 204(11) (c) (2)
contains the provision: "In the case of oil and gas wells the
allowance for depletion shall be 27/2 per cent of the gross
income from the property during the taxable year. Such allow-
ance dhall not exceed 50 per cent of the net income of the
taxpayer (computed without allowance for depletion) from the
property, except that in no case shall the depletion allowance
Carter v. Phillips, 88 Okla. 202.
Note 6, supra.
201 Allowance for Depletion of Oil Properties Under Revenue Acts,
C. W. Wittman, Jr., 6 N. I. T. M. 54 (1928). See also, Depletion of Oil
and Gas Properties Under Act of 1926, H. A. Campbell, 5 N. L T. M. 51.
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be less than it would be if computed without reference to this
paragraph. ',207*
Losses of oil and gas may arise from either unforeseen or
unavoidable causes, as fire or accident; or from causes that are
anticipated but unavoidable under operating conditions, as
evaporation, leakage, and refinery losses. The latter are inde-
terminate as to amount, and are taken care of in cost or operat-
ing expenses. Indeterminate losses of oil and gas may not be
deducted from gross income for income tax.
208
North Dakota statute of 1919 required that in determining
the income tax due to the state from foreign oil corporations all
property used by the corporation in manufacturing and refining
should be included. Under this statute the Tax Commissioner
in making a reassessment of the state income tax used the pro-
portion of business done within the state to that done without
the state as a ratio of allocation. Only property within the
state was that used in sales and distribution of products. Profits
from manufacturing and refining not done in North Dakota
were thus included. This was held to be error. Theories of
allocation have no place in determining income tax on a corpora-
tion, if the net income within the state can be distinguished from
other business. Since profits within state were known there was
no occasion to employ proportional allocation of state business
with the entire business of the corporation and the reassessment
tax was, therefore, void.2
0 9
Where an oil company purchased oil leases and thereafter
sold them at a profit, part of which was paid in cash and the
balance to be paid in deferred payments out of the proceeds of
oil, the company is not subject to an additionally assessed income
tax on the unpaid part which was only promised to be paid but
not in fact paid.210
It has been held that a stock dividend is not taxable as
income under the 16th Amendment. 211 But where the stock-
holders of corporations engaged in producing, buying and sell-
ing petroleum and in transporting it through its pipe lines,
'* For discussion of depreciation and depletion under the earlier
revenue acts, see, U. S. v. Ludey, 274 U. S. 295.
'0 11 A. L. R. 508.
"Fisher v. Standard Oil Co., 12 F. (2d) 744.
21 U. 8. v. Ohristine Oil &6 Gas Co., 269 Fed. 458.
211 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189.
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formed new corporations to which the pipe line properties were
conveyed by the oil corporations and all the capital stock in the
new corporations was distributed among the stockholders of the
oil corporations, pro rata, the shares so received by the stock-
holders were held to be dividends within the Act of 1913 and
taxable income within the 16th Amendment.212 That is, the
application of the Macomber case has been restricted to cases
where the corporation issues a stock dividend to its own stock-
holders. Such stock dividend is not income within the 16th
Amendment and taxable as such. But where a corporation
conveys its stock in the first instance to another corporation, or
to a holding company, and the stock is conveyed back to the
stockholders of the original corporation it becomes taxable as
income, if it was divided out of surplus of earnings. In the
Rockefeller case the capital of the old corporation remained
unimpaired and the stock conveyed to the pipe line company
was from surplus and thus constituted a dividend.
Under the Revenue Act of 1918, "the term 'corporation'
includes associations, joint stock companies, and insurance
companies." Plaintiff, an unincorporated joint stock association,
sued to recover income tax paid under protest and complains
of being classified as a corporation for purposes of income tax.
It was held that unincorporated joint stock associations though
partnerships under the Texas law, are corporations within the
definition of the Revenue Act of 1918, and are subject, like
corporations, to the income and excess porfits taxes imposed by
that act.
21 2 *
A much more extensive application of the income tax could
be made in the oil producing states. The need, however, of
placing the oil industry on the production tax basis is more
imperative. The two forms of taxes are not objectionable as
double taxation any more than an income tax with a property
tax. Both on income tax as well as a production tax are scien-
tific in that income forms the basis of taxation and both there-
fore conform to Adam Smith's first canon on taxation. Both
can be accurately administered and operates justly with respect
to both state and taxpayer.
21 Rockefeller v. U. $., 257 U. S. 176.
1* BurkeWaggoner Asso. v. Hopkins, 269 U. S. 110.
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VI.
Article I, Section 10, paragraph 2, of the United States
Constitution provides that "no State shall without the consent
of Congress lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports,
except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its
inspection laws." It has been held that "imports" within the
Constitution refers only to goods brought from a foreign
country and not to goods from another state. No intention
existed to prohibit by this clause the right of one state to tax
articles brought into it from another." ' 213 But under the com-
merce clause it is held that a state inspection fee levied upon
goods in interstate commerce, if in fact a tax and dispropor-
tionate to the cost of inspection, imposes an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce and is, therefore, invalid.
The Tennessee statute imposing an inspection fee of 25
cents per barrel on oil destined for sale in other states and
sustained in the Crain case has already been noted, 214 and that
the Crain case is probably no longer to be considered as
authoritative since the decision in Carson Petroleum Co. v.
Vial215 was also mentioned. It has been held that oils intended
for shipment outside of the state, and held at a storage depot
within the state, having come to rest within the state, are subject
to state inspection and tax, the same as oils for local distribu-
tion and sale. And that oils shipped to a depot outside the
state, for distribution within the state, and coming to rest and
inspected and taxed at that point, cannot be again taxed on
reshipment into the state in the original containers. 2
16 And oil
products intended for the distributor's own use may be taxed
by the state. This case but recognizes the principle that when
an inspection fee becomes a tax it cannot be imposed on oils in
interstate commerce unless the transit is ended by the goods
coming to rest. When at rest and mingled with the property of
the state they are taxable although then intended for interstate
commerce. They have not yet actually entered into the channel
of interstate commerce and until then the immunity from state
taxation does not attaeh.
""Woodruff v. Parkan, 8 Wall. 123.
"4 Note 109, supra.
*"Note 111, supra.
2' Union Oil Co. of Calif. v. State, 125 Wash. 327.
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A South Dakota statute relating to petroleum inspection
and imposing a fee of five cents per barrel for inspection,
regardless of quantity, and requiring that .all petroleum
products be inspected before they are sold in the state was
upheld.217 The case was affirmed in a memorandum opinion
by the U. S. Supreme Court.2 18 This case is sustainable on the
ground that the inspection fee is so small that it is only sufficient
to cover the costs of the inspection service, and would be upheld
regardless of whether the oil was still in interstate commerce or
in the original containers before sale.
A Georgia statute of 1890 provided for inspection of kero-
sene and petroleum products and fixed a fee of one-half cent per
gallon for lots exceeding 400 gallons and larger fees for smaller
lots, with monthly payments into the treasury of all sums in
excess of $100 per month which the inspectors could retain as
compensation. The charge for inspecting a tank car was $40,
of which the inspector could retain $10 for services and the rest
was paid into the treasury. It was held that this was a revenue
statute, as the fees largely exceeded the costs of inspection, and
that the statute was unenforceable as against importations
intended to be sold in original packages and so sold. But that as
to importations indefinitely stored within the state, or resold
there after breaking the original packages, it was held that they
were subject to both the inspection and the tax imposed as soon
as the interstate transportation was ended.21 9 The case was
affirmed by the Supreme Court.220  It is thus clear that
whether an inspection fee is valid or not valid depends upon
whether the amount of the fee is commensurate with the costs
of inspection. If it exceeds that so as to constitute a tax it is
invalid when imposed upon goods in interstate commerce and
before they have been sold in the original package.
While gasoline taxes exist now in every state, as we believe,
no attempt will be made to consider the statute of the various
states. Only the decisions that have arisen in the oil states, and
where they have been reviewed by the U. S. Supreme Court,
will be noticed, and the statutory provisions only incidentally.
-"Peterson Oil Co. v. Frary, 46 S. D. 258.
21 Same case, 264 U. S. 570.
21 Texas Co. v. Brown, 266 Fed. 577.
Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U. S. 466.
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A more extensive treatment dealing with the several states will
be found elsewhere.
221
Mississippi has a statute providing that "any person
engaged in the business of distributing gasoline, or retail dealer
in gasoline, shall pay for the privilege of engaging in such
business an excise tax of 4 cents per gallon upon the sale of
gasoline." The oil company sold gasoline to the United States
and did not include the amount of the tax in the price charged.
In a suit by the State for the tax it -was held in the State court
that the federal government was not entitled to buy gasoline to
operate its instrumentalities without payment'of the tax charged
gasoline dealers, since the tax was a privilege tax measured by
the number of gallons sold, and did not constitute a direct tax
against instrumentalities of the federal government.222  The
case was reversed, however, by the U. S. Supreme Court, holding
that the dealer was not liable for the tax on that sold to the U.
S. That the exactions demanded infringe its rights to have the
constitutional independence of the U. S. in respect to such
purchases remain untrammeled. Four Justices dissent in which
Holmes, commenting on Marshall's dictum that "the power to
tax involves the power to destroy," uses the expression, which
is destined to acquire no less fame, that "the power to tax is
not the power to destroy while this court sits.''223
The Texas court arrived at the same conclusion as the
Mississippi Court and held that an occupation tax of one cent a
gallon on gasoline sold and imposed on dealers in gasoline, was
not, as to sales made to the federal government, a tax on it or
any agency or instrumentality thereof. The fact that the com-
pany was engaged in the production and sale of gasoline and
sold gasoline to the U. S. did not make it an instrumentality of
the U. S. so as not to be subject to tax of one cent per gallon
sold.224 The case was reversed in a memorandum opinion on
the authority of Panhandle Oi7 Co. v. Mississippi.225 In a suit
to recover the gasoline tax of one cent a gallon of gasoline sold
within the state and imposed by the statute of 1923, it was held
The Gasoline Tax, Benjamin Wham, 21 fI1. Law Rev. 771 (1927).
=Miss. v. Panhandle Oil Co. (Miss.), 112 So. 584.
Panhandle Oil Co. v. Miss., 277 U. S. 218.
2H-Grayburg Oil Co. v. State (Tex. Civ. App.), 286 S. W. 489. Affd.
in 3 S. W. (2d) 427 (Com. of Tex. App.).
21 Grayburg Oil Co. v. Texas, 278 U. S. 582. Note 223, supra.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
that the statute was not void for inequality because made applic-
able to intrastate commerce only.
2 26
The Arkansas Statute of 1921 provided for the collection
of a tax upon the sale of gasoline and petroleum products to be
used by motor cars of one cent per gallon to be collected by the
seller from the purchaser. It was held not to be a property tax,
but a tax upon the privilege of using automobiles upon the high-
ways, and, therefore, not violative of the uniformity clause in
the state constitution. The statute was upheld and construed as
requiring sellers to collect and pay the tax only on such gasoline
as they had reason to believe the purchasers from them would
use in motors on the highways. 2 7 Retailers were required to
register and to report and pay monthly the taxes on sales made
and collected by them. Suit was brought in the federal court to
enjoin the enforcement of this tax. It was set forth that the
complainant sold a large quantity of gasoline of which 75 per
cent was used for motor cars and that it was at an expense of
$600 annually in preparing and filing reports and in collecting
and remitting the tax, but the court dismissed the bill, stating
that the tax is not leveled against the purchaser and that he
is required to do nothing under the act. The duty to pay the
tax as well as the penalties are imposed upon the seller and he
is allowed to reimburse himself by enhancing the price of gaso-
line by the amount of the tax.228 The statute does not under-
take to fix the price at which he may sell. The seller is liable
for the tax whether he collects it from the purchaser or not.
The ease was affirmed. The court holding that the retailer's
rights were not violated under the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment.229 In 1923 the statute was amended by imposing
gasoline taxes upon manufacturers and wholesale dealers. It
was held to have no application to a dealer who, at the time the
statute was passed, held large quantities of gasoline in storage
tanks which had been previously refined in the State.2 0
The New Mexico statute of 1919 imposed an excise tax of
two cents for each gallon of gasoline sold and used, and an
annual license tax of $50 for each distributing station or place
2State v. Pioneer Oil c Refining Co. (Tex.), 292 S. W. 869. Case
also in 273 S. W. 615.
221 Standard Oil Co. of La. v. Brodie, 153 Ark. 114.
'"Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hopkins, 282 Fed. 253.
2Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hopkins, 264 TU. S. 137.
Gay Oil Co. v. State, 170 Ark. 587.
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of business. In a suit by a distributor of and dealer in gasoline
and petroleum products it was shown that the sale of gasoline
from broken packages constituted 95 per cent and that in
original packages or tank cars 5 per cent of the business. The
U. S. District Court ruled that the entire statute was void as it
was not separable and, therefore, void both as to interstate and
domestic business. Reversing this on appeal the Supreme Court
held that the $50 license tax was void in whole since as to that
the statute was inseparable. And gasoline sold in original
packages broght into the state could not be taxed, but the excise
tax of two cents was valid as to all gasoline sold in the state not
in original containers.
2 31
The Colorado statute of 1919 imposed a tax upon gasoline
sold or used for motor vehicles to be used for the maintenance
of roads. The tax was not levied upon other users of gasoline.
The court held the act valid and that the classification was
reasonable and clearly defined. And being an excise tax it did
not violate the constitutional provision that all taxes shall be
uniform upon the same class of subjects. 2 32 The ease was dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction in a memorandum opinion by the
Supreme Court.2 " The Washington gasoline tax of two cents
per gallon for gasoline for use in motor vehicles operated upon
the public highways in the state was held not a "toll" forbidden
ky Federal Highway Act.2 3 4 The Arizona statutes of 1921 and
1923 imposing a gasoline tax and providing that it should be
collected by the dealer and added to the sale price of the dealer
of gasoline sold for use in motor vehicles was held to be a tax
on the purchaser, contrary to the holding by the federal court
under a like statute from Arkansas.2 35  That would seem to be
just a distinction in words. The incidence of the tax is intended
to be borne by the consumer in both cases, while the state only
looks to the dealer for the payment of the tax. The consumer is
not liable to the state for the tax and if the dealer fails to collect
it from the purchaser that does not alfect the dealer's liability
for the tax.
Bowman v. ContinentaZ Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642.
24 Attituce Oil Co. v. People, 70 Colo. 452.
11 Same case, 260 U. S. 693.
2 Cunningham v. Potts, 9 F. (2d) 469. Appeal dismissed for want
of jurisdiction in 273 U. S. 652,
! Texas Co. v. State (Ariz.), 254 Fac. 1060. Note 228, supra.
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The Montana statute of 1923 imposed a two cent per gallon
license tax on distributors and dealers in gasoline refined and
manufactured in Montana, but the tax did not apply to gasoline
shipped into the state and sold in the original packages. The
court held that the statute discriminated against Montana manu-
factured gasoline. The place of origin was the sole basis of
classification. The statute was, therefore, void as an arbitrary
discrimination against Montana refined gasoline.
23 6
Louisiana constitution of 1921, Section 21 of Article 10,
authorized the legislature to levy, and to provide for the collec-
tion of, a tax, not to exceed two cents per gallon on gasoline sold
-within the state. The statute enacted in 1921, Act No. 81,
purporting to be in pursuance of this authority levied a license
tax on dealers, already subjected to another license tax, and
without providing that the tax be collected from the consumers.
It was held that the intent of the constitution was to place the
burden of the tax on the consumer who had the benefit of the
roads, and that the statute was invalid. The constitution, con-
templating that the burden of the tax should be placed on the
ultimate consumer, operated as a restriction on the power of the
legislature to impose any other tax.
2 37
The Kansas statute of 1925 imposed a tax on the sale or use
of gasoline for motor vehicles and provided "that the tax . . .
shall be in lieu of all other taxes or license fees (except occupa-
tion taxes) upon the sale or use of said motor vehicle fuels."
A city by ordinance fixed an occupation license fee on certain
trades, occupations and businesses in the city. On each filling
station where one gasoline pump was used, $360; where two
pumps were used double that amount; and where no pumps were
used, but other means were employed for dispensing gasoline,
$360, all in annual license fees. It was held that the ordinance
was void. The charge was a license fee rather than an occupa-
tion tax and in conflict with the statute of 1925.238
A city imposed a license tax on corporations which sold oil
in the city, but placed a greater license tax on the ones which
brought in the oil in bulk, tank cars, or through pipes, than on
the ones which brought in the oil in barrels only. It was held
that the ordinance discriminated between members of the same
2 State v. Sunburst Ref. Co., 73 Mont. 68.
"'State v. Liberty Oil Co., 154 La. 267.
2"Duff v. Garden City, 122 Kan- 390.
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class, laying a greater burden on one than on another, and
violated the constitutional requirement of uniformity. But an
ordinance which imposes one rate of taxation on those who sell
oil from tank wagons or barrels transported through the streets
of a city, and another and lower rate on those who sell in a
different way, is valid. Here the classification is valid. The
difference in the manner of distribution is a reasonable classifi-
cation, as one imposes a greater burden on the streets, and is
more hazardous than the other.
23 9
The motor car gasoline tax is the one country-wide excise
tax. Its popularity with tax administrators is due to the fact
that it is an effective revenue producer and offers no difficulties
in the way of administration. It is practically self-executing.
The motorists have not complained because the proceeds have
usually, if not in every instance, been devoted to the construc-
tion and maintenance of highways. In some states the tax has
already reach the high rate of five cents per gallon and rates of
three or four cents are common. The rates have constantly been
increased, starting with a modest beginning of one cent per
gallon. This would lead one to reflect if the limit has not almost
been reached in states that now impose the highest rates. The
motorists are so numerous that they might offer effective opposi-
tion to further increase in rates should they desire to do so.
Extensive highway construction programs, such as that recently
completed or under way in Iowa financed by long term bonds,
are expected to be paid for largely out of revenues derived from
the gasoline taxes. With the completion of construction pro-
grams the motorist may well hope that the gasoline tax should
not be much increased in the future. Should the law seek to
divert this source of revenue to other forms of expenditures
more opposition to the tax would no doubt arise.
VII.
Under a production tax the method of assessment of taxes
is to require monthly or quarterly reports to be filed by the
lessee with the assessing authority showing the amount of oil
produced during the preceding period. In states applying the
property tax, the valuations, as we have seen, are often computed
in terms of production. Thus it is common to take the
" Standard OiZ Co. v. .Fredericksburg, 105 Va. 82.
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average daily production on January 1, or on tax day, and
multiply that production in barrels by the price that a barrel of
that production could be sold for in the market. This method
ordinarily gives a higher assessment per barrel for royalty oil
than for the oil produced by the lessee's working interest.
Where the royalty interest may be valued at $10.00 per barrel
the lessee's interest have been valued at only $4.50 per barrel in
the same instance.2 40 This method was used in Louisiana before
the present severance tax was adopted. The rule, employed by
the assessors for computing the oil producing value of the land,
was multiply the number of barrels of settled production on the
1st day of January by the current selling price or market value
per barrel of such production, based on its gravity and the
probable life of the particular field where the production is
situated.2 41 This selling price might be $10.00 per barrel or less.
A method that has been used in California consisted in taking
the total production for the taxable year and reducing that to
a net income basis. Then capitalize this at ten per cent of which
40 per cent was taken as the assessed valuation.242 Other Cali-
fornia assessors have used methods for ascertaining the value
of oil leases for which no rational basis can be found.
243
We have seen the application of the "unit of production"
rule in Oklahoma for the purposes of determining depletion
allowed from the gross production of oil and gas for the purposes
of determining the net income taxable under the state income
tax.244 In that state previous to the gross production tax law
the oil companies made a return of their property for the pur-
poses of taxation to the state auditor. After this was equalized
by the state board of equalization the valuation was certified by
the state auditor to the various county assessors where the tax-
able property was located. After the assessment had been so
certified the state board was without power to reassess the prop-
erty on the ground that omitted property had been discovered.
Omitted property could not be added until a subsequent year.
45.
We have seen that this is substantially the method pursued in
2_, Waggoner v. Wichita County, 298 Fed. 818. Note 130, supra.2 41Shaw v. Watson, 151 La. 893.
2 Note 66, supra.
-'2 Note 191, supra.2
1" Note 205, supra.
"Prairie OiZ & Gas Co. v. Oruce, 45 Okla. 774.
TAXATION OF OIL AND GAs INTERESTS
New Mexico at the present time.246 The gross production tax in
Oklahoma provides an exclusive method of taxation of the
minerals beneath the surface of the land. Land is separately
assessable and taxable, but in determining its value for taxation
purposes, the mineral contents actual or prospective, are to be
disregarded. Thus where land was returned at $250 for the
entire tract and the assessor increased the assessment to $18,000
because of the mineral value in the land the assessment was not
sustained. 2
47
Where the wells produced oil and gas, and where the gas
yielded $100, it was valued the same as if 50 barrels of oil had
been produced.248 In Indiana where oil wells are to be con-
sidered in fixing the value of the land an assessment was
increased by reason of such wells. The increase was not allocated
to any particular piece of land but was added to the sum of the
valuations of complainant's lands. The total value of the lands
were increased because of oil producing wells on some of the
tracts and the tax was upheld.240 The method of assessment in
Kentucky has already been considered. 250 In Louisiana the land
owner was required to return the land for assessment together
with the mineral value. The land was returned for agricultural
purposes only. The board of review adjourned to allow the
assessor time to obtain information to assess the minerals. The
assessment of the minerals was then added to the land at a
reconvened meeting of the board without notice to the owner.
The assessment was upheld and the owner having failed to make
the return was held estopped from contesting the correctness of
the assessment made by the assessor.251
Lessee was developing two contiguous tracts for oil and gas
owned by different owners. On one a large loss was sustained,
while the other produced a large profit. In his return for the
net proceeds tax he claimed the right to deduct the losses
sustained on the one from the profits on the other, on the ground
that they were operated as a "mine" which the Montana laws
allowed to be developed as a unit when there were two or more
24 Notes 18, 19; 31, 32, supra.
2I Kenayer v. Bd. of Equalization, 130 Okla. 3.2"U Cobb v. Downing (Tex.), 1 S. W. (2d) 508.
"Risley v. Rumble (Ind. App.), 144 N. E. 568.
" Note 64a, supra.
m-Palmer Go. v. Police Jury, 142 La. 1076.
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contiguous claims. But the deduction was not allowed. 25 2 The
rule with respect to mines is not applicable to oil and gas where
each landowner is interested in securing the maximum of his
share of oil. The interests of all parties are antagonistic, due to
fugacious nature of the minerals.
An Arkansas statute authorized the assessment of oil and
gas leases, whether owned by individuals or corporations, but
only corporations were subject to suits for back taxes. It was
held that this affords no discrimination that would render the
statute unconstitutional.253 No par value stock may by statute
be assigned a value of $100 for the purpose of computing any,
organization taxes required to be paid by the laws of the state,
and such statute is valid for the purpose of determining the
amount of franchise tax on foreign corporations. 254 In Illinois
where an ordinary oil and gas lease is held to effect a severance
of the estates and where the statute requires such severed estates
to be separately assessed, it was contended that the entire
mining right had been assessed to the lessee, contrary to the
provisions of the statute. The land was taxed $14.10, and it does
not appear what was the amount of lessee's tax. The court
states that it is not raised in record as to whether fee should
be taxed higher by reason of the one-eighth of the oil reserved.2 55
Evidently the royalty interest was not used to increase the value
of the fee.
The Standard Oil Company, an Ohio corporation, bought
petroleum in Pennsylvania and refined it outside the state; it
owned interest in individual partnerships doing business in
Pennsylvania as producers and refiners of oil; it was the owner
of stock in Pennsylvania corporations and of interests in limited
partnerships doing business in Pennsylvania also as producers
and refiners of oil. It was held that this did not constitute a
"doing of business in this commonwealth" so as to subject the
Standard Oil Company to taxation on its capital stock except
as to the interest it held in the individual partnerships. On this
it was taxable upon so much of the capital stock as represented
the proportion which its property and assets invested in the
02Rice Oil Co. v. Toole County (Mont.), 284 Pac. 145.
2" State v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., 22 S. W. (2d) 556.
21 State v. Pierce Petroleum Corp. (Mo.), 2 S. W. (2d) 790.
2" People v. Bell, 237 I1. 332.
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The unit rule which allocates that part of a corporation's
stock to a state in the proportion that the property within the
state bears to the entire property of the corporation wherever
situated is not permitted to be employed with respect to the
assessment of the property of oil corporations. When the value
of its property within the state is known there is no occasion
to allocate values on the basis of capital stock. The unit rule
may usually legitimately be employed in the case of public
service companies where the allocation of capital stock may be
based upon the ratio of the mileage within the state to the total
mileage in all states. The rule can be used with respect to tele-
graph companies and perhaps with respect to pipe lines to arrive
at franchise values. The property of oil companies, however, is
not tied up in any such unit relation that the proportion rule
can be used based upon the ratio of property. When the prop-
erty value can be determined that is all that is within the juris-
diction of the state to tax. Similarly, it is usually not permis-
sible to capitalize the net income for the purpose of arriving at
valuations as a basis for taxation in the case of oil companies.
Thus taxes were sought to be enforced against an oil com-
pany the levy of which were based upon the proportion of its
capital stock which was represented by its tangible property
in the taxing state. The tax was held invalid, the court stating
that the unit system of taxation can only be applied to public
carriers and other like public corporations and that the rule is
not applicable to oil refining companies or those engaged in
drilling for oil. There is no organic relation between plants and
refineries of oil corporations situated in different states, and
there can be no connected use of such plants authorizing a tax
levied on capital stock. A statute authorizing a tax on tangible
property of all corporations is not applicable to foreign corpora-
tions with respect to property outside the state. The capital
stock of such corporation is property permanently beyond the
state borders and precludes the state from taxing it.257 And it
was held that the Arizona statute providing for the application
of the unit rule to private car lines, railroad property, telegraph
Com. v. Standard Ol Co., 101 Pa. 119.
3' State v. Lion Oil Ref. Co. (Ark.), 284 S. W. 33.
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and telephone lines, does not authorize the unit rule valuation
for taxation of the property of foreign oil companies.25 8 We
have seen that a state income tax cannot be computed by using
the proportion of business done within the state to that done
without the state as a ratio of allocation if the net income within
the state can be distinguished from other business.
25 9
In a suit to enjoin the collection of an excess tax where the
capitalization method had been used it appeared that the total
value of the property was $191,855 which should have been
assessed on the basis of 50 per cent as other property. The tax
commission applied the capitalization of net earnings at six per
cent by which it valued the property at $439,592. It was held
that the commission cannot fix the valuation of natural gas
property by ascertaining the net earnings of the company and
then fix an amount as valuation which would produce the net
earnings at six per cent. The commission should take into con-
sideration the net income of the property as affecting its value,
but should also consider the probable producing life of the gas
wells, the increased cost of developing them and the percentage
of the capitalization of the concern included in the net income.
Taking the net income-alone of property as basis of valuation is
fundamentally wrong.260 In another case the county assessing
authorities had assessed the oil company's property at its full
cash value of $342,706 which was all property in the state and
included real estate, motor trucks and sales stations in the
various counties. The Arizona state board of equalization
determined its net profits on sales in the state for the year in
question which it capitalized at 25 per cent resulting in a valua-
tion of $2,910,600. The company was granted an injunction,
The statute of Arizona required the assessment of all taxable
property at its full cash value which the state board could not
ignore and tax its intangible property by the capitalization
method fixed upon earnings generally without regard to specific
items of its property. The statute conferred no authority to tax
earnings, and intangible property included only franchises,
credits, and choses in action 2 6 1  In a California case the
capitalization of ten per cent based on net income deduced by
2Standard Oil Co. of Calif v. Howe, 257 Fed. 48.
" Note 209, supra.
2Martineau v. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Go., 141 Ark. 596.
2Note 258, supra.
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the assessor was upheld as a basis for finding the value of an oil
lease. But it did not appear that the statute directed that any
other method be pursued. Duty to assess the oil leases was
enjoined upon the assessor and he sought to determine that
value by using production as a basis. 26 2 The court stated that it
was limited in its investigation only to ascertain that the valua-
tion was not fraudulent.
The value of capital stock may be ascertained by either of
three methods: the stock and bond, the capital plus surplus, and
the capitalization of net income methods. In arriving at the
value of the franchise under the Kentucky statute the value of
the capital stock is first determined. From this the assessed
value of the tangible property of the corporation is deducted.
The remainder represents the franchise value. In a suit to
restrain the enforcement of a franchise tax it appeared that the
value of the capital stock had been determined by the capitaliza-
tion of net income method. The average net income was taken
from the incomes of the three preceding years. This was
capitalized at seven per cent and the value of the tangible prop-
erty deducted. The court, however, holds that the method of
arriving at the franchise value was wrong as only the net income
in the past was considered by the commission, whereas the prob-
able net income which would accrue to the company in the future
must be considered in arriving at the value of the franchise.
This was a domestic pipe line corporation whose business and
line were confined entirely to Kentucky. The court then pro-
ceeds to estimate the net income each year for a period of 20
years in the future from the year in question on a decreasing
return basis. The present worth of this aggregate inedme, plus
non-taxable securities and other quick assets gives a total value
for all its property of $4,408,000. By the use of the stock and
bond method the total property value is found to be $4,500,000
substantially checking. From this value the non-taxable securi-
ties and the assessed value of the tangible property are deducted
leaving $1,229,000 for franchise value, whereas the franchise
value found by the commission was $5,484,000 where it capital-
ized the average net income of the past only. Upon this value
the tax is allowed. 2 3 The case was not appealed. The income
"Note 66, supra.
2" Cumberland Pipe Line Co.'v. Lewis, 17 F. (2d) 167.
K. L. J.-7
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of a pipe line that only serves a single oil field will obviously
diminish each year after the field is fully developed until the
income will ultimately approach zero as a limit. Therefore, in
assessing the value of a franchise this future diminution of
income should be taken into account.
The courts are disinclined to grant injunctive relief to
restrain the collection of taxes on the ground of interference
with the due administration of government. Thus where taxes
are illegal in part an injunction will not be granted unless the
legal part is tendered. And where the statute provides for the
payment of disputed taxes under protest and suit for recovery
the- remedy at law is considered adequate so injunctive relief
will not be given. And where the law provides for administra-
tive appeals those must be pursued before any relief can be had
in the courts unless the time for such appeals has expired
without fault of the complaining party. But where no juris-
diction to tax exists injunction is always a proper remedy to
restrain the collection or levy of an illegal tax. Ordinarily there
can be no recovery when illegal taxes are voluntarily paid.
Thus a mere mistake in judgment in valuation by taxing
boards or commissions from which no appeal lies, cannot be
relieved in equity, but it will restrain illegal taxes assessed by
such boards, induced by fraud, gross mistake, discrimination,
non-uniformity or the adoption of fundamentally wrong
methods.264  And where it was sought to restrain the collection
of back taxes on omitted property and a remedy by appeal to the
county court was given from the final action in imposing such
taxes it was held that the court has no jurisdiction to give
equitable relief where a party had not availed himself of the
administrative remedy provided for by statute. Such adminis-
trative remedy is exclusive. 265  But injunction is a proper
remedy against the collection of a tax on property not subject
thereto. 266 And where a franchise tax is levied under a repealed
statute it is void and its collection will be enjoined. The statute
under which the tax was levied required the levy of the franchise
tax on the proportion of the capital stock of the corporation as
represented by its "property and business" in the state. The
2"Note 260, supra.
2 Busey v. Prehistoric Oil & Gas Co., 79 Okla. 121; same In Perry
Y. Carson, 61 Okla. 263.
2 "St. Mary's Gas Co. v. Elk County (Pa.) 43 At. 321.
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law in force requires the levy of the franchise tax upon the
proportion of the subscribed capital stock of the corporation
represented by "property owned and used in business" trans-
acted in the state. The tax under the statute in force was very
much smaller and the court enjoins the collection in excess of
what the amount, should be under the statute in force.267 Where
there is no statute authorizing a recovery, gasoline taxes volun-
tarily paid under an unconstitutional statute cannot be
recovered.2 8 And for the further reason that these taxes had
been collected from the consumers of motor car fuel and cannot
be returned to them should the tax be refunded.
We have seen that where the landowner failed to make a
return of the mineral estate for assessment he was estopped
from contesting the correctness of the assessment made by the
assessor and was not entitled to insist upon notice of the recon-
vening of the board of review. 26 9 And where a severance tax
had been collected under the old law and an increased severance
tax is collected under the new law for the same period the tax-
payer is entitled to have the tax paid under the old law credited
upon the amount subsequently collected after the tax rate had
been increased. 270 An injunction was sought to prevent the
levying and collection of the proportionate share of the gross
production tax upon a royalty share of oil produced from
restricted Indian lands which were non-taxable. The statute
authorized the withholding of royalty by the lessee until the tax
was paid. The suit was dismissed since the statute provided for
the payment of taxes under protest and an action to recover the
same, which furnishea an adequate remedy at law and is
exclusive. Therefore, the court did not pass upon the validity
of the tax. 271 The Supreme Court dismissed the case for want
of jurisdiction since the state court disposed of it on the ground
that the complainant had a plain, adequate and exclusive remedy
at law by paying the tax under protest and suing for its
recovery, and did not consider the federal question whether the
plaintiff was exempt from the tax. The court states the rule
that a judgment of a state court which is put upon a non-federal
"'Koonce v. Pierce Petroleum Corp., 176 Ark. 187.
'"Richardson Lubricating (o. v. Kinney, 337 Ill. 122.
20 Note 251, supra.
2** Gulf Ref. Co. v. McFarland, 157 La. 713.
3McCoy v. Childers, 124 Okla. 256.
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ground, independent of the federal question involved and broad
enough to sustain the judgment, cannot be reviewed by the
Supreme Court, unless the non-federal ground is so plainly
unfounded that it may be regarded as essentially arbitrary or
a mere device to prevent the review of a decision upon the
federal question. Since the state court based its decision upon
an earlier state decision the non-federal ground was sufficient to
sustain the decision and no intent to evade the federal question
is indicated.
27 2
Section 280 of the Revenue Act of 1926 purports to
empower the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to determine
the liability at law or in equity of a transferee of property of a
taxpayer. It was held that the statute was unconstitutional as
the transferee is entitled to his day in court before he can be
made liable for the tax of another. The statute attempts to
confer judicial power upon the commissioner and is void. When
the government undertakes to collect this liability from a third
party against whom it was not originally assessed, the liability
must rest upon contract, either express or implied. And the
Revenue Act of 1928 which provides that" no suit shall be main-
tained in any court for the purpose of restraining the assess-
ment, or collection of the amount of the liability, at law or in
equity, of a transferee of property of a taxpayer in respect of
any income, war-profits, excess profits or estate tax . . " is
likewise void, as withdrawal of remedy falls with the unconstitu-
tional statute.237
VIII.
A few cases that do not readily admit at classification may
be grouped under a miscellaneous heading. Thus where the
lessor executed an oil and gas lease reserving the usual royalty
and in the further consideration of a bonus part of which was
payable out of the oil to be produced the lessee could not under
the severance tax statute retain the tax on this fraction of the
oil that was security for the unpaid part of the bonus. Deferred
payments to be made from the production of oil and gas is not
such an interest as would be chargeable with the severance tax.
The statute of 1923 provided that a "tax shall be required of
'"2McCoy v. Shaw, 48 S. Ct. 519.
mMic-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Alexander, 35 F. (2d) 43.
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the severed or produced actually engaged in the operation of
severing natural products whether as owner or lessee." Since
the lessor is not engaged in severing the product he is not liable
for the tax though a part of the consideration was payable out
of seven-sixteenths of the first oil and gas produced. 274 Pipe
line companies and refineries receiving oil were made collectors
of the severance tax under the statute.
The tax ferret law of 1921 in Oklahoma has been held to
apply only to property omitted from assessment, and it does not
confer power or authority to revalue or reassess property which
has already been assessed. Thus where one company owns
refined oils stored in tanks on and in the possession of another
company, and the latter company renders such property for
taxation in its own name and pays taxes thereon, such property
may not thereafter be entered upon the tax rolls as omitted
property.27
5
We have seen that the gross production tax in Oklahoma
is in lieu of the ad valorem tax on the leases and on the equip-
ment immediately devoted to the production of oil. The ques-
tion arose whether certain houses built by the operator of an oil
lease for housing his employees are a necessary part of the equip-
ment of a producing oil lease so as to come within the exemption.
It was held that this is one of fact to be determined by the court
under the circumstances of each particular case.2 76  The
Louisiana constitution of 1898, Article 230, provided that "there
shall also be exempt from parochial and municipal taxes for a
term of ten years from the 1st day of January, 1900, the capital,
machinery, and other property employed in mining operations."
The question arose whether that exempted oil wells from taxa-
tion. Oil in Louisiana was unknown at the time of the adoption
of this constitutional provision and the court holds that the
term "oil well" is not included within mining operations and
does not come within the exemption from taxation. Laws grant-
ing exemptions from taxation must be strictly construed, and
so the operation of an oil well cannot be held to be within the
exemption granted to those engaged in mining operations. 277
A filling station on leased land which the lessee was
-'McFarlane v. GiZer (Ark.), 294 S. W. 3.
2Payne County v. Empire Petroleum Co., 104 Okla. 42.
.'TJosey Oil Co. v. Bd. of Comrs., 107 Okla. 266.
2J. M. Guffey Petroleum Co. v. Murrel, 127 La. 466.
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privileged to remove is taxable as personal property. 278 A
Kentucky statute imposing a tax of $10.00 on oil depots wherein
petroleum or other oils are stored in bulk or tank is invalid as
a property tax under the constitutional provision which requires
taxes to be uniform and property to be assessed at its fair cash
value, and taxed in proportion to value. Nor is it valid as a
license tax if the subject of the license is construed to be the
oil depot or building. The tax of $10.00 imposed on each depot
in state where petroleum is stored in bulk or tank is to be con-
strued as a police regulation and is valid as an incident of regu-
lation because of the dangerous character of oil. But where
the appellant maintained a warehouse in which it kept oil stored
in barrels in about car lots and the statute did not purport to
tax merchants who stored oil in barrels and small lots the
appellant has the same rights as merchants and the conviction
was not sustained.27 9 Oil imported in tank steamers and
pumped into receiving tanks belonging to the importer, for dis-
tribution by the owner of the tanks, has lost its character as an
import and becomes subject to local taxation.2 80 A Texas
statute imposed an occupation tax on gas companies (including
some other public service companies) at the rate of one-half
per cent in cities of 25,000 population and over and one-fourth
per cent in cities from 10,000 to 25,000. No occupation tax was
levied in cities below 10,000. The tax was levied on the gross
receipts. It was held that the statute did not violate the consti-
tution requirement of uniformity in taxation. The classification
was reasonable and not arbitrary.
281
Ix.
The nature of the business of oil and gas production has
given rise to the leasing system. Since under the ordinary oil
and gas lease the lessee becomes entitled to remove the oil and
gas discovered and produced in the course of exploration and
development and only a small fraction is reserved by the land-
owner as royalty, the question has arisen, who is owner and
taxable for the respective interests that each enjoys under the
z8 Boxer v. Sears, 119 Kan. 733.
Standard Oil Co. v. Commonwealth, 119 Ky. 75.
Mexican Petroleum Corp. v. South Portland, 121 Me. 128.
2"Dallas Gas Co. v. State (Tex. Ciy. App.), 261 S. W. 1063.
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lease. By the great weight of authority an ordinary oil and gas
lease creates a severance between the mineral and surface estates.
And this notwithstanding the fugacious nature of oil and gas.
The lessee thus becomes vested with ownership of his share of
Lhe mineral and the lessor retains the surface and his royalty
interest. Each is then taxable upon his respective share. An
ordinary agricultural lease is not taxable to the lessee while a
mineral lease is. In the latter, however, the lessee removes a
part of the corpus of the land which is not the case in the
former.
Texas courts have taken the strongest position in support
of the severance theory. In that state an ordinary oil and gas
lease vests a determinable fee in the lessee to the oil and gas in
place. This interest is separately taxable to the lessee. In Ken-
tucky severance of the estate is likewise recognized, but the con-
stitutional rule that leases shall be assessed at the fair cash
value estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary
sale is unworkable in practice and resolves itself into a matter
of opinion evidence, since leases are not sold or offered for sale
at the time of assessment. Of some fifteen or more oil producing
states only Ohio and Oklahoma refuse to recognize the severance
doctrine and, therefore, hold that an oil and gas lease is not
taxable to the lessee. The adoption of the production tax in
the latter state has rendered the question unimportant there.
Some states hold that a lease which purports to grant and con-
vey the oil and gas in the land affects a severance while a lease
that merely confers a right, privilege, or license to enter and
explore and remove th6 mineral do not affect a severance of the
estates. This has been the Kansas and West Virginia view. In
the latter state undeveloped oil leases have not been taxable to
the lessee since the decision in the South Penn Oil Co. case.
In the taxation of the respective interests of lessor and
lessee the property tax prevails in nearly all states. In a few
states the property tax is supplemented by a tax measured by
the amount or value of the oil and gas produced. Since an oil
lease is practically impossible to value for purposes of taxation
because of the unknown character and quantity of the mineral
the general tendency and practice is to turn the property tax
into a production tax by roughly measuring the value of the out-
put rather than valuing the lease itself. In California where
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only the property tax prevails the tendency is to value the leases
in terms of production. Equipment devoted to the production
of oil is taxable in all states, except Oklahoma, under the
ad valorem tax. Kansas like Kentucky provides for an unwork-
able statutory formula for valuing oil leases and the consequent
attempt to base lease valuations on production. A production
tax should replace the property tax in such cases.
A property tax administered on a production basis fre-
quently takes the average daily production of a well on January
Lst or tax day and multiplics the number of barrels by the price
that a barrel from the well would sell for in the market. This
may be $1,000 or less. The market value of the lessee's interest
will be less. The daily production times this sum will be the
assessed valuation of the well or lease. Under this system a
well with a declining production will be over assessed, while new
wells coming in after tax day will go untaxed for the balance of
the taxable year.
Pipe lines are taxable ai real property and under the
federal income tax transporters of their own oil must pay the
same tax as if they transported oil for hire. The oil moving
through the pipes in interstate commerce cannot be taxed as
property. *While receipts derived from transportation in inter-
state commerce are subject to a state income tax, a state should
be permitted to tax the oil as property in passing through the
pipe line. It seems that the total quantity of oil in the pipe line
passing any given point in the line during the entire year could
be taxed on its market value in proportion that the pipe line
mileage in the state bears to the entire pipe line mileage in all
the states. Such tax would have to be levied by the ,tate and
apportioned.
Oil in storage tanks used in connection with pipe lines for
the interstate movement of oil is exempt from taxation to the
extent that the quantity stored is necessary to keep the oil inov-
ing. Other oil in storage is taxable ad valorem. Storage tanks
are taxable ad valorem, except those immediately devoted to the
production of oil in Oklahoma. Tank cars are taxable like other
rolling stock. In Louisiana tank cars owned by non-resident
individuals and corporations that have not acquired a Louisiana
domicil are subjected to the additional 25 mills state tax in lieu
of all local taxes. Residents and those domiciled there are sub-
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jected to local taxes and not to the 25 mills tax. It seems that
to facilitate uniformity in tank car taxation in Louisiana, tank
cars and rolling stock, whether owned by residents or non-
residents, by domiciliaries or non-domiciliaries, should be taxed
by the state tax commission alone and the tax distributed to the
local subdivisions.
The unsuitability of a property tax as a means for the
valuation of oil leases is demonstrated from the fact that either
the property tax is turned into a production tax or leases are
not taxed at all, which would follow with respect to undeveloped
leases. A property tax based on production will result either in
over taxation in a developed field or many have the opposite
result where the field is in process of development. In West
Virginia it proved to be impossible to tax oil and gas to the
lessee under the property tax. The logical substitute for a
property tax is a tax on the production of oil and gas and this
should be in lieu of any other tax on the mineral contents in
the land. While the Oklahoma gross production tax levies three
per cent on the market value of all oil and gas produced, and
which tax is in lieu of all other taxes on the leases and the equip-
ment immediately devoted to the production of oil, the state
board of equalization has the power on proper showing to vary
the rate so as to make the tax conform in amount to the
ad valorem tax for all purposes. This is the rule with respect
to ordinary leases. With respect to departmental leases where
it has been held that the gross production tax does not apply
the equipment used in the production of oil is taxed ad valorem.
Oklahoma has an approved system for the taxation of oil and
gas.
The same may be said of the severance tax system in
Louisiana under the 1928 law. Here the tax is upon all natural
resources severed from the soil. Oil is taxed at four cents per
barrel of 28 gravity and below up to eleven cents per barrel of
42 gallons for oil of 43 gravity or above. Since the price of oil
in the oil industry is based upon gravity this Louisiana sever-
ance tax is based upon scientific principles. Then the tax is in
lieu of all other taxes upon leaseholds, but the equipment is
subject to the ad valorem tax. Arkansas has a severance tax in
lieu of tax on leaseholds and equipment is taxed ad valorem like
Louisiana. The Kentucky gross production tax which was in
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lieu of all other taxes on wells was held not to be a substitute
for the ad valorem tax on wells and leases. It is thus apparent
that the Kentucky constitution must be amended before the
state can have a gross production tax in lieu of all other taxes.
Montana, Texas, and West Virginia are the only other states
that have a production tax supplementing the ad valorem
property tax. Other states should enact approved production
taxes like those found in Oklahoma and Louisiana.
Oklahoma and Arkansas are the only oil producing states
that have income taxes. These are levied at low rates. While
income taxes at higher rates might be used in all the states to
supplement the production tax, the state income tax for the oil
industry is not so imperative as a production tax.
Inspection fees are validly imposed by the states under the
police power to ascertain that certain standards are complied
with, even with respect to oil and gas transported in interstate
commerce, if the fees do not assume the proportion of a tax for
revenue but are only adequate to defray the costs of the service.
Taxes on gasoline for motor vehicle use is perhaps levied by
every state in this country. The tax is an effective revenue
producer and easy of administration, and since the proceeds are
devoted to highway improvement little opposition to this tax
arises from the consumer.
The unit rule in taxation which finds frequent application
in the case of public service concerns is not ordinarily applicable
to oil and gas production and refining and is not permitted to
be used. There is no organic relation between refineries and
producing fields and property of oil companies located in
different states to warrant the application of the rule. The
same may be said with respect to the so-called capitalization rule
as applied to net income for the purpose of determining the
value of leases or the capital stock for franchise taxes.
Injunction is not ordinarily a proper remedy against the
collection of illegal taxes, unless there was no jurisdiction to
levy the tax. The part of the tax that is legal must be tendered,
and where statutes provide for the payment of taxes and suit
for recovery the remedy at law is adequate, and administrative
remedies for relief must first be pursued. And where taxes
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